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The relationship between interlocking directorates and firm performance has been increasingly 
debated, with a focus on whether firmâ€™s centrality in interlock networks is associated with 
performance. The purpose of this study is to not only examine how a firmâ€™s position in this 
network is associated with performance, but also how the performance of network partners can 
impact a firmâ€™s performance. This study examines how firms effectively utilise the interlock 
network to achieve the goal of higher market capitalisation â€“ termed market capitalisation rank 
(MCR).
The premise of the study is the UK FTSE 350 firms from 2014 to 2018. The paper makes use of a 
temporal network autocorrelation model to examine how firm characteristics, the structural position 
in the interlock network, and the performance of network partners affect MCR over time.
The analysis indicates that firms with ties (via the interlock network) to firms with high market 
capitalisation are more likely to enhance their own MCR, highlighting network partners have the 
opportunity to play a critical role in a firmâ€™s dominance strategy to optimise firm value.
CUST_RESEARCH_LIMITATIONS/IMPLICATIONS__(LIMIT_100_WORDS) :No data available.
CUST_PRACTICAL_IMPLICATIONS__(LIMIT_100_WORDS) :No data available.
CUST_SOCIAL_IMPLICATIONS_(LIMIT_100_WORDS) :No data available.
The value of this research is that it does not only look at the impact of a firmâ€™s position in the 
network on performance, but the impact of the performance of network partners on a firmâ€™s 
market performance as well.

































































Title: Market ranking and network structure: Pathway to dominance 
Abstract 
Purpose: The relationship between interlocking directorates and firm performance has been 
increasingly debated, with a focus on whether firm’s centrality in interlock networks is 
associated with performance. The purpose of this study is to not only examine how a firm’s 
position in this network is associated with performance, but also how the performance of 
network partners can impact a firm’s performance. This study examines how firms effectively 
utilise the interlock network to achieve the goal of higher market capitalisation – termed market 
capitalisation rank (MCR). 
Design/methodology/approach: The premise of the study is the UK FTSE 350 firms from 
2014 to 2018. The paper makes use of a temporal network autocorrelation model to examine 
how firm characteristics, the structural position in the interlock network, and the performance 
of network partners affect MCR over time.
Findings: The analysis indicates that firms with ties (via the interlock network) to firms with 
high market capitalisation are more likely to enhance their own MCR, highlighting network 
partners have the opportunity to play a critical role in a firm’s dominance strategy to optimise 
firm value. 
Originality/value: The value of this research is that it does not only look at the impact of a 
firm’s position in the network on performance, but the impact of the performance of network 
partners on a firm’s market performance as well.   
Keywords: Boards of directors; Interlocking directorates; Resource dependency theory; 
Network analysis


































































How do director network ties impact firm performance? This is a question that has been 
increasingly debated in the last decades (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Do firms with directors 
with a large network, sitting on multiple boards represent a certification of their expertise, where 
these knowledgeable and experience directors add value to the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983)? 
Or are these directors over-burdened and unable to fully commit to their governance roles on 
boards, resulting in a negative impact on firm performance (Cashman et al., 2012; Sarabi and 
Smith, 2021)? Do directors provide linkages between firms, allowing for a flow of resources 
and information between them that would be otherwise unavailable (Martin et al., 2015)? Do 
firms reap the benefits from access to these additional sources of knowledge provide by 
directors’ network (O’Hagan and Green, 2004)? These are some of the questions that have been 
debated and discussed in recent years through the lens of interlocking directorates. Interlocking 
directorates are when a director sits on multiple boards, causing these firms to interlock 
(Mizruchi, 1996). Interlocking directorates can be viewed as a network of directors, and within 
the literature it is one of the most studied form of inter-organisational relationships (Haunschild 
and Beckman, 1998). The lack of consensus on whether directors sitting on multiple boards, 
creating inter firm linkages, has a positive or negative impact on firm performance has resulted 
in this debate becoming a somewhat controversial issue within the broader field of management 
and corporate governance (Connelly and Van Slyke, 2012; Smith and Sarabi, 2020). 
The appointment of a director constitutes a strategic decision for a public company (Adams, 
2017), often in their pursuit of improved performance or optimising the value of the firm. 
Strategies employed to optimise firm value can be viewed as a strategy to become dominant. 
Tang and Thomas (1994) define strategies for a firm to optimise firm performance or value (by 
some given criteria) as horizontally dominant strategies. Therefore, the appointment of directors 

































































can be considered to be a horizontally dominant strategy, a strategy by a firm to achieve 
increased value and a position of dominance in the market. 
The issue of board members with multiple directorships has caught the attention of policy 
makers, where in several countries there is legislation or governance codes advising against (or 
event restricting) the number of directorships an individual can hold. In the UK, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) have noted that there should be careful consideration when deciding 
to appoint a director with many existing directorships, and that the justification for any such 
appointment should be included in the company’s annual report (FRC, 2018). In the US, a 
similar pattern to the UK can be observed, where the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 
(a key advisory body providing guidance on how institutional investors should vote at annual 
meetings where directors are elected) recommends that when a director has more than six 
existing appointments votes to appoint this director should be withheld (Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), 2017). In 2013, the Indian government passed a law limiting the 
maximum number of board memberships to ten (Aggarwal et al., 2020).   
Network analysis of the interlocking directorates has been frequently applied to address the 
issue of whether board members with multiple directorships, creating ties or interlocks to other 
firms, bring value to a firm (through increased performance) (Fennema and Schijf, 1978). 
Network analysis of interlocking directorates often examine whether firms with a most central 
position in these networks perform better, yet existing empirical work still provides mixed, and 
even contradictory results. Whilst there is substantial research tackling the link between a firm’s 
position in these corporate networks and performance, what is often neglected is the impact of 
the performance of network partners on firm performance. In the extant literature, studies that 
do acknowledge the performance of network partners tend to focus on the preference of firms 
to connect to prestigious actors (Ahuja et al., 2009, 2012; Chandler et al., 2013; Powell et al., 
2005), rather than performance implications. As noted by Brennecke and Rank (2017), there is 

































































a tendency to treat all interlock ties equally in existing studies, and to not fully acknowledge tie 
heterogeneity in interlock ties. This is especially important when considering performance; 
would a link to a well performing firm have a different impact on firm performance, practices, 
and strategy, compared to a firm in decline, with a poor performance?   
This study aims to contribute to the literature examining the link between firm performance and 
interlocking directorates ties, by examining a relatively understudied area: the impact of the 
performance of network partners on a firm’s performance. More specifically, we examine 
whether market capitalisation is associated with boardroom interlocking amongst the UK FTSE 
350. We use market capitalisation as a measure of rank, which we refer to as market 
capitalisation rank, or MCR, from here on. Firms with a higher MCR have larger values of 
market capitalisation. Market capitalisation is a forward-facing, market-based measure of firm 
performance. Additionally, market capitalisation represents a basic valuation technique that 
reflects the market position and value of the firm, and is in a form that is understandable (and 
readily available) to practitioners and users (Nazir and Malhotra, 2017).  
In order to identify whether linking to firms with increased performance increases a firm own 
performance, we employ a complex network model, the Temporal Network Autocorrelation 
Model (TNAM). The application of the TNAM allows not only to test whether a firm’s central 
position in a network is associated with an increase in performance but can also test the specific 
impact of the performance of direct network partners on performance. This can therefore 
provide insights into how the performance of direct connections contributes to a firm’s strategy 
of (horizontal) dominance and optimise firm value (according to market capitalisation). 
This paper is structured as follows: the next section provides an overview of the literature on 
interlocking directorates, focusing on the link between a firm’s position and its performance. 
This section concludes with a more detailed presentation of the research questions that this 

































































paper seeks to address. This is followed by a data and methods section, noting the data sources 
and methodology (including the model specification) to address the research questions. A 
results section follows, providing both the descriptive analysis and modelling results. In 
addition, there is a section describing a set of robustness checks. The final section provides a 
conclusion, an overview of the main results and limitations, along with directions for future 
research. 
2. Literature review
In this section, we discuss the central theoretical framework to explain director interlocks, 
resource dependency theory. We then provide a discussion on a salient issue within interlocking 
directorates studies, the relationship between firm centrality and performance. We unpack this 
further, examining the impact of firm position on accounting-based measures of performance 
and market-based measures of performance. Following this, we present an overview of firm 
prestige and performance and conclude with the research questions that this study addresses. 
2.1.  Resource dependency theory and interlocking directorates
Several theoretical frameworks have been developed to understand the antecedents and 
consequences of interlock ties at the organisational level. It has been argued that the 
consequences of interlock ties are the dissemination of ideas and governance practices, 
increasing the legitimacy of the firm, shaping strategy and ultimately impacting performance 
(Caiazza et al., 2019). A key theoretical framework to understand interlocking directorates is 
resource dependency theory. This suggests that interlocking directorates create links to other 
firms, which provide them with access to additional (often essential) sources of advice, 
information, or market intelligence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Therefore, these interlocks 
serve as a mechanism for firms to manage and reduce environmental uncertainty (Boyd, 1990). 
Resource dependency theory would suggest that interlocking directorates allow firms to 
establish effective relationships that can facilitate beneficial knowledge exchange between 

































































firms (Hillman et al., 2009). Resource dependency theory therefore argues that interlocking 
directorates have a positive impact on firm-level outcomes and performance (Galvão et al., 
2019; Zona et al., 2018). Resource dependency theory draws on insights from sociology and 
management literature (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992); sociologists indicate that 
these director interlocks provide firms with access to the corporate elite, social (and in some 
cases financial) capital, and (on rare occasions) competitors (Mizruchi and Stearns, 2006). 
There has been growing interest in interlocking directorates (Caiazza, 2019; David and 
Westerhuis, 2014), where empirical analysis of these networks is utilised to address research 
questions on corporate governance (Kogut, 2012) and knowledge flow between firms (O’Hagan 
and Green, 2002). The relationship between interlocking directorates and firm performance has 
received particular attention (Sánchez et al., 2017). Some scholars find, in line with the 
expectation of resource dependency theory, that interlocks have a positive effect on firm 
performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Others identify a negative effect (Santos et al., 2012), 
which points towards interlocking directorates spreading maladaptive practices in the network, 
together with time constraints on directors with multiple appointments limiting their abilities as 
effective monitors. This study proposes to contribute to this literature, by examining the link 
between interlocking directorates and market capitalisation, complementing the existing 
literature, by applying a forward-facing market-based measure of performance. Market 
capitalisation has been utilised in a range of empirical studies to capture firm performance 
(Nazir and Malhotra, 2017; Priyadharshini et al., 2015).
2.2.  Centrality and firm performance
When examining firm-level behaviour, it is important to acknowledge that firms do not act in 
isolation from one another; rather, their behaviour is often highly interdependent, as they are 
embedded in a networked environment (Granovetter, 1985). The notion of embeddedness has 
often been used to explain how network ties influence firm-level outcomes. The concept, widely 

































































discussed in Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), is based on the notion of centrality. Centrality captures 
the importance or prominence of actors in a network and is one way of considering the “roles” 
of actors in a network, without focusing on the specific individuals who play these roles 
(Borgatti and Everett, 1992). This positional embeddedness approach allows for an 
investigation into the benefits gained from information stemming from particular positions in 
the network. 
The interplay between centrality in an interlocking directorate system and firm performance 
has been examined in detail (Drago et al., 2015). Within this stream of literature, a wide range 
of metrics and measures are used to capture firm performance; these are often categorised as 
either market-based or accounting-based measures. Accounting-based measures tend to be 
historical measures of performance, with a backward- and inward-looking focus, where they 
reflect past firm successes and failures. They are, therefore, a staple reporting mechanism and 
measure of corporate performance (Kiel a d Nicholson, 2003). By contrast, market-based 
measures reflect the overall value placed on the firm by the market and are forward-facing 
measures of performance. Market-based measures place an emphasis on the future expected 
earnings of the firm that capture current strategies. Examples of accounting-based measures 
include Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Return on Capital Employed 
(ROCE). Examples of market-based measures include Tobin’s Q, market-to-book ratio, and 
market capitalisation. Given the wide variety of measures to capture performance, the impact 
of interlock ties can vary substantially. 
2.2.1. Accounting-based measures of performance
Several studies have examined the interplay between interlocks and firm performance, drawing 
on accounting-based measures. Larcker et al. (2013), in an in-depth investigation of the 
relationship between centrality and firm performance (measured by changes in ROA) in the 
US, examine multiple measures of network centrality. Firstly, they examine degree centrality, 

































































a count of the number of ties of each firm as determined by their interlocks. Firms with a higher 
degree centrality are assumed to have more channels of interaction with others. Betweenness 
centrality, the number of times an actor sits on the shortest path between two others, captures 
the brokerage potential. Closeness centrality is a metric that captures how “close” an actor is to 
all others in the network; information or resources may flow quicker to those with higher 
closeness centrality. Eigenvector centrality captures the centrality of an actor’s alters, i.e. the 
case when those well-connected actors are connected to other well-connected actors. Larcker 
et al. (2013) note that there is a positive impact of firm centrality on performance (for all types 
of centrality), yet the returns from holding a central position are not immediate. A further 
analysis of ROA and interlocking directorates in the US is provided by Martin et al. (2015). 
They identify a strong positive effect of interlock networks on firm performance, but only when 
uncertainty is high. 
Yu and Chiu (2013) analyse the impact of i terlocks in Taiwan on another accounting-based 
measure of performance, sales growth. Whilst there is often a lack of consensus on the impact 
of centrality (or position in the interlock network) and firm performance, Yu and Chiu (2013) 
state that this is due to a non-linear relationship between the two. They identify an inverted U-
shaped relationship between centrality and firm performance: centrality has a positive impact 
on firm performance, until the centrality reaches a certain level, at which point it has a negative 
impact on firm performance. They conclude that firms benefit from a moderate centrality, 
where firms with higher levels of centrality experience higher costs in terms of absorbing and 
integrating more diverse information extracted from interfirm network ties.   
2.2.2. Market-based measures of performance
Market-based measures are also utilised in the extant literature considering the link between 
firm performance and the corporate interlock system. Similar to studies utilising accounting-
based measures, studies using market-based measures have identified both positive (Baran, 

































































2017; Baran and Wilson, 2018; Horton et al., 2012) and negative (Nam and An, 2018) 
relationships between market based performance measures and a firm’s network position. Croci 
and Grassi (2014) analyse the impact of a variety of centrality metrics on firm value as measured 
by the Q-Ratio, a market-based metric, for a set of Italian firms. They identify a consistent 
negative relationship between degree and eigenvector centralities and firm performance, while 
betweenness centrality is not associated with a reduction in firm performance. This highlights 
differences between centrality measures, and how they impact firm performance; while degree 
and eigenvector centralities are likely to be associated with power and influence, betweenness 
and closeness are associated with the flow and transfer of information between firms. 
In this paper we make use of market capitalisation as a measure of firm performance. We 
selected a market-based measure (rather than an accounting-based measure), as this study wants 
to focus on how current strategies shape performance, to aid in the identification of the pathway 
to dominance, and therefore, a forward-facing measure is more appropriate. This allows us to 
look at how a firm’s position within the network can impact future value, which is of particular 
interest to practitioners and users. 
2.3.  Partner prestige and firm performance 
In addition to the work examining the link between centrality and performance, there is a stream 
of literature that examines the processes underpinning the formation of interlock ties, and the 
preferences that firms have for certain types of firms when creating interfirm linkages. For 
instance, Ahuja et al. (2009) argue that firms poorly embedded in corporate systems are less 
likely to form interfirm ties as they lack the informational and reputational benefits; whereas 
highly embedded firms are more likely to form ties with other highly embedded firms, to 
mitigate uncertainty. Others note that many firms have a preference for creating ties with 
prominent firms as they can enhance firm legitimacy (Knoben and Bakker, 2019), and that this 

































































is of particular importance for younger firms (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Higgins and Gulati, 
2003).
This has resulted in another stream of literature examining how links to prominent and 
prestigious firms impact performance. For instance, Jahan et al. (2020) find, in an examination 
of firms from New Zealand, that prestigious board members have a positive impact on firm 
performance (measured by both market- and accounting-based metrics). Gulati et al. (2011) 
propose a set of key mechanisms to explain how network resources contribute to firm 
performance: reach, richness, and receptivity. Reach refers to how wide-ranging and 
heterogeneous the organisation's network connections are, where the greater the diversity, the 
greater the reach. Richness is the value a firm can derive from the attributes of network partners, 
i.e., the ability to orchestrate network ties and integrate them with the firm’s own resources to 
create greater value. Receptivity is the extent to which a firm is able to channel, leverage, and 
utilise network resources. In this paper, we draw on the richness mechanisms to better 
understand the impact of the interlock network on firm performance We focus on the concept 
of richness (rather than reach and receptivity) as we are interested in how the MCR of network 
partners can impact firm performance and contribute to the firm becoming (horizontally) 
dominant. 
2.4.  Research questions
This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the relationship between networks and 
firm performance. This paper asks several questions regarding the effect of network ties and a 
firm’s position in the network, on market capitalisation rank (MCR), using the UK FTSE 350 
between 2014 and 2018 as the empirical setting. We ask questions regarding how a firm’s 
position in the network is associated with performance, drawing on measures of centrality, as 
observed in the extant literature.  More specifically, we follow the work of Larcker et al. (2013) 
and utilise degree, betweenness, and eigenvector centralities. We then go beyond only looking 

































































at centrality and examine the impact of the performance of network ties on firm performance, 
not just the position of a firm in the network and the number of connections.  This allows us to 
empirically test the richness hypothesis outlined by Gulati et al. (2011), investigating whether 
a firm draws value (in this case MCR) from the attributes of network partners.
We address the following focal research questions in our study, relating to the impact of the 
firm’s position in the network and effects on MCR amongst the FTSE 350.
1. Is centrality in the interlock network associated with higher MCR? 
2. Are ties to firms with higher MCR associated with improving a firm’s own MCR? 
These research questions allow us to inform on whether network ties constitute an important 
part of a firm’s (horizontally) dominant strategy to optimise firm value (according to market 
capitalisation). 
3. Data & methods 
3.1.  Data
We examine a network of firms that are linked by ‘shared’ directors, which means directors 
who sit simultaneously on the boards of these firms. We refer to this network as the interlock 
network, where firms are linked by interlocking directorates. 
We examine firms that are on the UK FTSE 350 index. Constituents of the UK FTSE 350 
represent large and mid-sized firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (the top 350 firms 
listed on the stock exchange). The UK FTSE 350 contains the constituents of the UK FTSE 100 
and 250. 
This data is extracted from a combination of Companies House (British government website) 
and Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis. Companies House provides data on the directors who sit on the 
boards of UK firms, along with the start and end dates of their directorships, and details on the 

































































sector the firm operates in (defined using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes). 
Information from Companies House is used to construct the interlocking directorate network, 
and to calculate the board size of each firm. Orbis provides additional firm-level data, more 
specifically, firm financial data. We extract firm data on the number of employees and Return 
on Capital Employed (ROCE) from Orbis. We examine UK FTSE 350 firms from 2014 to 2018. 
We have selected this five-year period as it is a reasonably stable one in terms of market 
changes, hence we can assume that market values during this period are more closely associated 
with profit rather than risk. The market capitalisation data, the firm performance measure 
utilised in this study, is extracted directly from the London Stock Exchange. 
Table (1) provides descriptive information on the firm-level variables. We observe high levels 
of variation in the ROCE amongst firms, suggesting a high level of variability in firm 
profitability (in terms of how profit is generated from firm capital). Average firm size, 
according to the number of employees (normalised), is constant across time. Board size appears 
to be increasing, yet the variation in board size is decreasing (slightly). 
------------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here.
-------------------------------------------
In this study, we employ a number of network metrics and measures to study the interlock 
networks of UK FTSE 350; these are discussed in further detail in the model specification 
section. 
3.2.  Methods
An advanced network model is used to address the research questions presented in this paper: 
the Temporal Network Autocorrelation Model (TNAM). 


































































The autocorrelation model was first developed and applied to detect the presence of spatial 
autocorrelation, and its impact on a dependent variable ((Cliff and Ord, 1972). Autocorrelation 
models have been frequently applied in social network analysis (Leenders, 2002), mainly to 
model social influence and contagion patterns, as they allow researchers to empirically test for 
network effects on actor behaviour. In recent years increased attention has been given to the 
methodological development and extensions of network autocorrelation models, including 
temporal variants (Dittrich et al., 2017; Leifeld et al., 2017). The TNAM has been applied in a 
variety of contexts, such as to address research questions regarding networks and political actors 
(Metz and Ingold, 2017).
The model is applied by considering a weight matrix, W (the network), where wij reflects a tie 
between i and j, and the weight captures the extent to which actor j (the alter) influences the 
behaviour or performance of actor i (the ego). Leenders (2002) and Wang et al. (2014) provide 
a detailed description of the formulation of the network autocorrelation model. The TNAM is 
one of the most comprehensive models available to investigate the performance of an actor in 
a network. The performance of an actor i can be estimated conditional to a wide range of 
variables, including actor covariates, the performance of network partners, and the previous 
performance of actor i (see Silk et al., 2017 for an in-depth discussion of the model). Following 
the approach outlined by Leenders (2002), a normalisation process is applied to the weight 
matrix. Utilising the established approach observed in the literature, and recommended by 
Leenders (2002), a row normalisation is applied to the weight matrix. With row normalisation, 
the same weight is assigned to every outgoing tie of actor i, proportional to the total number of 
connections actor i sends. Under this normalisation process, every actor is influenced to the 
same extent from all their connections, however, as their total number of connections increases, 
the less influence each individual actor j has on actor i. 

































































3.2.2. Application of the TNAM to the interlock network 
In this context the TNAM allows us to examine how the interlock network influences firm 
performance. However, when examining the link between the director interlock network and 
firm performance, the issue of endogeneity arises. Whilst a firm may intend to improve firm 
performance when appointing a director with multiple directorships, an alternative explanation 
is that prominent directors are matched to high-performing firms (Kim and Higgins, 2007; 
Omer et al., 2014). That is, well-connected directors accept positions at highly performing 
firms. Given the potential endogeneity issues, a robustness check is implemented, following the 
main TNAM estimation. 
We draw on the approach presented by Larcker et al. (2013), where they restrict the analysis in 
their robustness checks to subsets of firms. Following this approach in the robustness check 
analysis, the interfirm network (W) is split into two parts. The first is a network of interfirm ties 
that remained the same from the previous year (t-1) to the current year (t), and the other is an 
interfirm network of ties between firms that have changed from the previous and current year. 
The TNAM is then implemented separately for each of these networks. The results from the 
TNAM for the network that has remained unchanged from one year to the next are less likely 
to be a result of endogenous choices by firms (Barzuza and Curtis, 2014). Therefore, there will 
be three sets of TNAM applications: firstly, on the original data (we refer to this as the main 
TNAM), secondly to the interlock network where ties have remained constant, and finally to 
the interlock network where ties have changed from year to year (the final two model sets are 
referred to as the robustness check TNAMs). 
3.3.  Model specification
The outcome variable used in this study to reflect market rank is market capitalisation. We 
include a number of firm-level variables and network effects in the TNAM specification to 

































































examine what influences the MCR over time. We include a lagged market capitalisation term 
to assess the impact of previous MCR on current MCR levels.
3.3.1. Firm-level covariates
We include two firm-level covariates to control for company size and financials in the analysis: 
number of employees and ROCE respectively. Number of employees is an established measure 
to capture the size of the firm, and ROCE is an accounting-based firm metric (Kalsie and 
Shrivastav, 2016). This allows us to better assess the impact of network effects on MCR – above 
and beyond the effect of firm size and financials, and how network ties shape a firm’s MCR. 
A further firm covariate that is included is board size; the impact of board size on firm 
performance has long been a matter of debate. Several studies have found that a larger board 
has a negative impact on firm performance (Cheng, 2008; Nguyen et al., 2016; Yermack, 1996), 
where they argue that a larger board leads to poor communication and ineffective decision 
making, which undermines effectiveness (Guest, 2009). However, others argue that a larger 
board results in better monitoring, as larger groups naturally give rise to more diversified 
opinions. These larger boards offer the opportunity for greater scrutiny, and an increased 
likelihood of rejecting risky decisions, which can have a positive impact on performance. A 
resource dependency theory perspective would argue that larger boards bring more 
opportunities to access external resources, therefore should have a positive impact on firm 
performance. Belkhir (2009) examines the impact of board size on performance in the banking 
sector and does not find evidence of firms with smaller boards outperforming those with larger 
boards, rather the results point towards an increase in performance of firms with a larger board 
size. 
The inclusion of board size in the model specification allows for an investigation of the impact 
of board size on MCR, indicating whether it is an efficient board that is able to make decisions 

































































quickly (a smaller board), or effective board governance and monitoring (a larger board), that 
is associated with MCR. 
We also create a sector similarity term to test whether firms operating in the same sector 
(according to their one-digit SIC code) hold similar MCR. This term captures whether two firms 
similar in one dimension (sector) are more or less likely to be similar in another (MCR).
3.3.2. Network effects 
In addition to the firm-level covariates, we include several network effects. These are structural 
effects that are based on the interlock network. 
Firstly, a structural similarity term is specified (similar to the sector similarity term). This 
measure allows for an examination of whether firms that hold equivalent (or structurally 
similar) positions in the network, also have an equivalent MCR (Westphal et al., 2001). 
A further structural variable is also included in the model: clustering. This captures the extent 
to which high levels of local connectivity and cohesion can have positive coordination effects. 
Large levels of cohesion may lead to increased levels of redundant information exchanges, 
which may have a negative impact on performance (Croci and Grassi, 2014).
Following the approach applied in the extant literature, we include centrality measures to 
capture whether holding a more central position in the interlock network is associated with 
higher MCR. 
Firstly, we consider degree centrality, which we view as a measure of activity. In this context, 
the degree centrality of a firm is the number of firms it is connected to via interlocking 
directorate ties (Freeman, 1978). This allows us to test whether being connected to a high level 
of firms is beneficial – by giving access to more resources. 

































































Secondly, we consider betweenness centrality, which refers to the number of times a firm sits 
on the shortest path between two other firms in the network (Freeman, 1977). Betweenness 
centrality captures a firm’s brokerage in the network, and we view this as a measure of flow. 
This allows us to test whether acting as a broker in this firm interlock network is associated 
with MCR. 
Finally, we look at eigenvector centrality, which not only captures the number of ties a firm has 
in the network, but also the number of ties of its network partners. Eigenvector centrality is a 
measure of global connectivity. Firms with a high eigenvector centrality are connected to other 
well-connected firms in the network (Bonacich, 1987). 
Given the correlation between centrality measures (Valente et al., 2008), these three terms are 
included in different models. The inclusion of these centrality measures in the model 
specification addresses the first research question posed by this paper.
In order to address the second research question, we include a network lag variable that we refer 
to as the netlag term. The terminology originates from the spatial autoregressive modelling 
literature, where the term spatial lag is used to capture the effect of spatial autocorrelation. The 
netlag parameter captures how much direct network partners influence the MCR of firms. A 
positive and significant parameter would indicate that, if a firm is connected to firms with a 
high MCR, it is more likely to improve its own MCR. A negative and significant parameter 
would indicate firms with prominent MCR potentially gaining more from interlock ties with 
partners with less favourable MCR and hence having more bargaining power (Clark and 
Mahutga, 2013). Additionally, the use of the netlag term allows us to test the mechanisms 
proposed by Gulati et al. (2011) and, in particular, the richness process, where a positive and 
significant term would indicate a firm’s tendency to utilise high-performing (or rich) network 
partners to increase their own value.

































































3.4.  TNAM formulation 
For all the structural and network effects (structural similarity, netlag term and various 
centrality measures), the lag is taken that is, the effect is for the position in the network of the 
company at the previous timepoint on current MCR. The lag is used, as it takes time for a firm 
to reap the benefits from an interlock tie (Larcker et al., 2013), where beneficial knowledge 
exchange is unlikely to be instantaneous. Additionally, the use of  lagged variables also aids in 
alleviating potential endogeneity effects (Li et al., 2019).
Therefore, in this case the TNAM is defined as follows:
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝜌𝑊𝑡 ― 1 +  𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽2𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀
Where:
  refers to the dependent variable, market capitalisation of actor i at time t 𝑦𝑖𝑡
  refers to the effect of the weight matrix – the firm interlock network𝑊𝑡 ― 1
  refers to the vector of lagged structural network effects of actor i (structural 𝑥𝑖𝑡 ― 1
similarity, netlag term and various centrality measures)
  refers to the vector of firm covariates (number of employees, ROCE, board size, 𝑧𝑖𝑡
sector similarity)
4. Results
4.1.  Descriptive network analysis
Before proceeding to model implementation, several descriptive statistics are calculated to 
provide an overview of the network data under examination. Networks are often characterised 
by an area where most actors are connected, with only a limited number of actors disconnected 
from this area or section. This is referred to as the giant connected component (or main 
component), and has long been recognised as a feature of interlocking directorate networks 

































































(Chu and Davis, 2016). In this paper, the network is also characterised by a giant connected 
component. Given that we are focused on the impact of network ties on MCR, the analysis will 
be restricted to firms that are part of the largest connected component during the timeframe. 
Therefore 229 firms are included in this study and all subsequent analysis, both descriptive and 
modelling, is limited to these 229 firms. Firms outside the connected component tend to be 
isolates, or small sets of firms connected with a limited number of ties. 
The descriptive statistics for the additional firm covariates specified in the model, ROCE, 
number of employees, and board size are presented in Table (1). The mean ROCE appears to 
have remained constant over time; however, the spread of ROCE has reduced substantially 
since 2014. The mean and spread of number of employees has remained constant from 2014 to 
2018. The average board size appears to have increased slightly since 2014. In Spain, policy 
recommendations have been made outlining that the ideal board size is between 5 and 15 
individuals (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Fernández-Fernández, 1999). Table (1) 
indicates that the board size of UK FTSE 350 firms is within these guidelines. 
Table (2) presents a set of descriptive network statistics for the giant connected component over 
the five-year time period. To better understand the overall structure of the interlock networks, 
we use various network measures, namely density, diameter, degree centralisation, and 
clustering coefficient. These represent established measures within social network analysis to 
explain the salient features of a network structure. We provide a short description for each of 
these measures, and brief interpretations for the interlock network. 
Density is defined by calculating the ratio of observed ties to all possible ties in a network 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994), and acts as a measure of network connectivity. Table (2) 
indicates that network density is relatively low across the time period yet has increased very 
slightly since 2016. 

































































Network diameter is the longest geodesic distance in the network; where the geodesic distance 
refers to the number of relationships in the shortest possible path from one actor to another 
(Knoke and Yang, 2008). From Table (2), we can see that the actors in the network have become 
“closer” to each other between 2017 and 2018, with a reduction in the diameter value. Chu and 
Davis (2016) examine the average geodesic distances for the US case, from 1997 to 2010, in 
their analysis of the US corporate elite. In their study, they note a contrasting result where, in 
the main connected component, they observed an increase in the average geodesic distance. 
This highlights a key difference between the US and the UK in terms of the structure of the 
interlock network, indicating a fracturing and reduced connectedness amongst the corporate 
elite in the US, a fracturing that is not widely observed in the UK where, instead, firms move 
closer to each other. 
Degree centralisation captures distribution of degree centrality in the network. In a network 
with a high degree centralisation score (closer to 1), the degree centrality is concentrated in a 
handful of actors in the network, whereas a lower score (closer to 0) would indicate that it is 
evenly distributed throughout the network (Borgatti et al., 2018). Table (2) indicates that degree 
centralisation remains relatively low across the time period, with a slight increase in 2018.  
The clustering coefficient is a measure of network cohesion and represents the average of the 
densities of the neighbourhoods of all of the actors (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), therefore it 
captures the extent to which the network is characterised by areas of high density. As observed 
in Table (2) the clustering coefficient remained relatively constant over the time period, yet it 
dipped slightly in 2017 and 2018. This suggests that in later years the network is not 
characterised by densely connected areas. 


































































Insert Table 2 about here.
-------------------------------------------
4.2.  TNAM results
4.2.1. Firm-level covariate results
Table (3) presents the results for the main TNAMs (the first set of TNAMs applied to the 
original data). There are three models, one model for each centrality measure. In terms of the 
firm covariate results, number of employees is positive and significant. This indicates that larger 
firms are much more likely to have higher MCR. However, the ROCE effect is not significant, 
suggesting that a higher level of financial resources is not associated with MCR amongst the 
UK FTSE 350. Board size is a positive and significant effect, indicating that firms with larger 
boards are more likely to have higher MCR. This is in line with the findings of Belkhir (2009), 
suggesting that these larger boards offer greater scrutiny, leading to less risky, performance-
enhancing decision making. In regard to the ideal board size, as recommended by Spanish 
policy makers, this suggests a board size closer to 15 directors (the upper limit) may be more 
beneficial (in terms of firm performance).
------------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here.
-------------------------------------------
Lagged market capitalisation is positive and significant, indicating that previous MCR has a 
significant impact on current MCR. This points towards some consistency in the dominant 
players in the FTSE 350 during the time period. Sector similarity is a negative, small, and 
weakly significant term in the model, indicating that firms belonging to the same sector do not 
significantly share MCR, rather they have diverging MCR. This potentially points towards an 

































































uneven distribution of MCR in sectors, suggesting there are a few highly ranked actors in each 
sector. An examination of sector leaders in the network represents an avenue for future research.  
4.2.2. Network effect results
The network effects specified in the model include netlag, clustering, structural similarity, and 
the various centrality measures. The netlag result is consistently positive and significant, 
although this significance is reduced in the flow (betweenness centrality) and global 
connectivity (eigenvector centrality) model results. This provides evidence that a firm enhances 
its MCR by connecting to firms with high MCR. It also indicates that firms do not gain from 
connecting to firms with low MCR, suggesting there is no benefit in having network partners 
dependent on them for knowledge and advice. This also provides support for the richness 
mechanism proposed by Gulati et al. (2011), that the richness of network resources is a key 
component to enhance firm value.     
The structural similarity effect is positive and weakly significant in the activity (degree 
centrality) model (and non-significant elsewhere). This suggests that, in some cases, firms with 
a similar position in the interlock network do share some aspects of their MCR. The clustering 
parameter is non-significant, indicating that clustering does not accrue positive coordination 
effects, nor does it lead to high levels of redundant information. It does not impact MCR 
amongst the UK FTSE 350. 
Overall, we do not observe consistent effects for the link between performance and centrality 
across the different types of centrality, as seen in the main TNAM results presented in Table 
(3) (a phenomenon observed elsewhere in the literature). For degree centrality, there is a 
positive and weakly significant result, suggesting that having a higher number of ties accrues 
positive performance effects. For both betweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality, the 
parameters are non-significant.  Weak and non-significant centrality terms may be a result of 
the ambiguous link between firm performance and interlocking directorates, as noted in the 

































































existing literature. However, Larcker et al. (2013) note that director networks provide economic 
benefits that are not immediately realised in the stock market, and therefore may not have an 
immediate impact on the market capitalisation of firms at the one-year lag we employ here. 
This suggests future work should look to expand the timeframe of our study and focus on the 
long-term impact of interlocks on market capitalisation rank. 
4.3.  Robustness checks 
As noted in the methods section, when investigating the link between a firm’s position in the 
interlock network and firm performance, the issue of endogeneity arises. For instance, in the 
results presented in Table (3), the positive and (weakly) significant degree centrality effect and 
the positive and significant netlag effect may reflect a preference for well-connected directors 
to sit on the boards of high-performing firms. However, in a slight contrast to this argument, 
Jiang et al. (2020) note that declining firms will often appoint prominent directors, indicating 
that director appointments are not only a result of  matching, rather the appointment of these 
directors is to increase the perceived performance of the declining firm, especially to outside 
parties. 
Therefore, to overcome these potential robustness issues, we implement the checks outlined in 
the methods section, which follows the approach outlined by Larcker et al. (2013). Tables (4) 
and (5) present the results of the robustness checks. Table (4) presents the TNAM results for 
the interfirm interlock ties that have remained constant from one year to the next.  Table (5) 
reflects the TNAM results for interfirm network ties that have changed from one year to the 
next. These results indicate that the netlag parameter is only significant for network ties that 
remain unchanged from one year to the next, rather than new ties. This result is in line with the 
work of Larcker et al. (2013), suggesting the return on performance from connecting with high-
performing firms is not immediate, rather performance benefits are accrued over time. 


































































Insert Table 4 about here.
-------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------
Insert Table 5 about here.
-------------------------------------------
When examining the network effects in the robustness checks presented in Tables (4) and (5), 
we observe, for the structural similarity term, that the significance drops off slightly; however, 
the result was only significant for the degree centrality model in the main TNAM (the set of 
TNAMs applied to the original data). A similar pattern is observed for centrality in the degree 
centrality robustness models. This adds to the mixed results in the literature examining the link 
between firm performance and measures of firm centrality. 
The netlag result in Table (4) follows the same pattern as the main TNAM given in Table (3), 
but in Table (5) the netlag result is non-significant (and negative). This indicates that the 
performance of network partners has a positive effect when these are long-term interfirm 
linkages, rather than newly formed. These findings are in line with Larcker et al. (2013), that 
the market value benefits from interlock ties are not instant. Th s result also suggests that the 
netlag result is less likely to be an outcome of endogenous firm choices and appointments. A 
further robustness check is presented in the appendix to further support the results presented in 
this paper. 
Table (6) provides a summary of the key findings and differences between the main TNAM 
(those applied to the original data) and the robustness checks (the two sets of TNAMs applied 
to the network constant ties and changing ties). In particular, this highlights the differences in 
the netlag results. 


































































Insert Table 6 about here.
-------------------------------------------
5. Conclusion
This paper posed two research questions examining the role of network ties on market 
capitalisation rank (MCR) amongst the giant connected component of the UK FTSE 350, which 
consists of 229 companies. The paper seeks to contribute to the extant literature by applying a 
resource dependency perspective and to examine the richness element of the model proposed 
by Gulati et al. (2011). We asked whether firms occupying more central positions are more 
likely to improve their MCR and whether firms are more likely to improve their MCR by 
establishing ties to other firms with high MCR. To address these research questions an advanced 
network model, the Temporal Network Autocorrelation Model (TNAM), was applied to a 
network of interfirm connections amongst the UK FTSE 350 from 2014 to 2018. 
In order to address the first research question, a set of centrality measures were included in the 
model specification. In line with extant studies on the impact of interlocking directorates and 
firm performance, the impact of centrality effects on MCR is mixed. There was some evidence 
that direct ties (degree centrality), more specifically the number of direct ties to other firms, are 
positively associated with MCR. By contrast indirect measures of network prominence, such as 
betweenness and eigenvector centrality, do not have a significant relationship with MCR. These 
results are in line with those of Yu and Chiu (2013), which suggest that moderate centrality is 
more likely to have a positive impact on firm performance than very high centrality levels. 
Future work could unpack the relationship between market capitalisation rank and a wider range 
of centrality measures to explore further the relationship between network centrality and firm 
performance. Additionally, there is scope to further test whether there is an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between centrality and market capitalisation performance.

































































To address the second research question, a netlag parameter was included in the model 
specification. The results indicate that the MCR of network partners significantly affects a 
firm’s own MCR, providing some support for the richness mechanism proposed by Gulati et 
al. (2011).
Overall, our analysis suggests that beyond firm size, the network effect that matters for a firm 
to increase its MCR is not necessarily centrality in the interlock system (as reflected by the 
weakly significant centrality results) but creating ties to other firms with high MCR. This has 
an implication for strategic decisions about director appointments. Rather than appointing a 
director with many other appointments, using multiple appointments as a certification of the 
director’s abilities (Cashman et al., 2012), firms should examine the market capitalisation rank 
and performance of the firms where the directors already hold an appointment. The results 
presented in this paper indicate that MCR matters, and that when a firm is looking for network 
partners for strategic knowledge exchange, the MCR of potential partners should not be 
neglected. When firms appoint directors to create these strategic partnerships, they should look 
to appoint directors from firms with higher MCR. Therefore, the practical contribution of this 
research is that firms should not disregard the connectedness of directors when making 
appointments, as the network partners have an impact on performance; however, they should 
not focus only on the number of appointments a director holds but should also look at the quality 
(or prominence) of these appointments. These results also indicate that network ties have the 
potential to act as important elements of a firm’s (horizontally) dominant strategies to optimise 
firm value. Furthermore, we observe that a larger board size is also associated with increased 
MCR; firms can practically implement this to potentially increase market capitalisation. This 
paper also contributes to empirical work drawing on theories of resource dependency, and the 
related work of  Gulati et al. (2011) on the performance of network connections and related 
consequences. 

































































When comparing these results to previous studies, a number of similarities and differences 
between the UK and US case (a prominent empirical setting for many interlock studies) emerge. 
In particular, we observe that many of the findings here, both for the main results and the 
robustness tests, are in line with the work of Larcker et al. (2013). For the case of the FTSE 
350, the position and network ties emerging from the interlocking directorate system have a 
positive impact on firm performance, yet the benefits are not instantaneous. In terms of the 
structure of the network, differences emerge between the UK case and existing work examining 
the US. Whilst many have noted that the interlocking directorate network is fracturing and 
becoming less connected in the US in the past decade (Chu and Davis, 2016; Mizruchi, 2013), 
this is not observed in the UK, for the case of the FTSE 350, where there still exists a main 
connected component, with a short distance between firms. 
5.1.  Limitations of the study & future research 
A salient point to note from the robustness checks presented in this paper, more specifically the 
change in significance of the netlag parameter for the newly formed interlock ties network, is 
that there is a need to interpret these results, along with practical recommendations, with 
caution.  There is also a need to further unpack the link between the performance of connections 
and a firm’s performance in future research. 
There are limitations to the analysis of a market-based measure of firm performance presented 
in this study. We only concentrate on the main connected component, and disregard other 
isolated, or small components. The results indicate that it is not necessarily centrality that has a 
positive impact on firm performance, rather it is the performance of partners, therefore this 
suggests that further research would be required. 
An additional avenue for future research would be to explore different market performance 
measures, such as those that would capture the market dominance of firms in the interlock 
system. This would allow for an investigation into whether the impact of the interlocking 

































































directorate network remains consistent across market measures. Examples of potential 
measures are presented by  Hellmer and Wårell (2009) and Melnik et al. (2008) in their 
examination of the Nordic electricity market. A further area to examine in more detail is the 
dynamics of market capitalisation rank at the sector level, given that our results indicate 
potentially uneven distribution of market performance at the sector level. In addition, further 
research could also examine how the performance of network ties, and not only centrality 
measures, shapes performance for accounting-based measures.  
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The paper highlights the issue of endogeneity when examining firm performance and the 
interlock network. It may not be the case that ties created by the interlock network result in 
increased performance, rather that prominent directors are matched to high-performing firms. 
The robustness checks presented in the main text follow the approach of Larcker et al. (2013). 
In this appendix, further supporting robustness checks are implemented to provide additional 
checks on the main results.
The robustness check that is implemented in this appendix to alleviate the endogeneity issue in 
this study follows the appro ch outlined by Boehmke et al. (2016). This robustness check uses 
an Instrumental Variable (IV) two-stage estimator; IV approaches are an established technique 
to address endogeneity concerns (Liu, 2014). The underlying concept associated with this 
technique is that endogeneity is stripped from the variables in question by substituting them 
with a set of suitable instruments; as noted by Ahuja et al. (2012), it is often difficult to identify 
appropriate instruments for robustness tests. This paper follows the strategy outlined by 
Boehmke et al. (2016), utilising an Instrumented Network in our estimation. In the two-step 
estimator procedure, an instrumented network is utilised instead of a direct IV. This approach 
involves, firstly, simulating the firm interlock network to construct the instrumented network. 
This Instrumented Network is then used to construct the relati nal effects specified in the 
model, acting as IVs in the estimation process. 
When simulating the firm interlock network to create the Instrumented Network, a complex 
network model, a Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model (TERGM), as developed by 
Leifeld et al. (2018) is used. This approach has been utilised in empirical network studies to 
deal with endogeneity concerns (Smith et al., 2016). The TERGM approach allows us to 
specify a model of network tie formation, which is then used to simulate the network based on 
this model.

































































Table (7) presents the results for the robustness check, utilising the second approach, the 
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. This is the result for the TNAM model utilising the 
simulated networks to construct the network metrics, along with weight matrix – the firm 
interlock network. There are some noticeable differences when comparing the results from the 
robustness check presented in Table (7) with the main results given in Table (3). In particular, 
we observe on the robustness check that the significance levels have dropped for the netlag 
terms, and centrality (in the case of the degree centrality model). This indicates some caution 
must be used when making firm recommendations on the basis of the netlag parameter. The 
findings from the robustness checks in the main text may act as a potential explanation for the 
drop in significance level of the netlag parameter in this IV TNAM. 
------------------------------------------
Insert Table 7 about here.
-------------------------------------------
































































Table 1: Descriptive statistics for firm covariates for in the main component of UK FTSE 
350, 2014 – 2018 
Variable 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
ROCE (log) Mean 15.44 10.54 12.76 13.19 13.78
ROCE (log) SD 35.23 41.84 18.61 17.32 12.96
Number of Employees (log) 
mean
8.54 8.54 8.57 8.66 8.66
Number of Employees (log) SD 2.07 2.01 2.00 1.98 1.97
Board Size Mean 8.72 9.27 9.27 9.86 10.24
Board Size SD 3.24 2.74 2.74 2.49 2.46
































































Table 2: Descriptive network statistics for main component of the interlock networks of UK 
FTSE 350, 2014 – 2018 
Network Statistics 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Density 0.0063 0.0069 0.0069 0.0081 0.0094
Diameter 22 22 22 22 20
Degree centralisation 0.0245 0.0195 0.0195 0.0227 0.0302
Clustering coefficient 0.2479 0.2992 0.2992 0.2075 0.1794











































































(Intercept) 2.6118*** 2.5718*** 2.5687***
(0.2362) (0.2366) (0.2396)
time 0.0631** 0.0624** 0.0625**
(0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0196)
ROCE 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Number of Employees 0.0605*** 0.0605*** 0.0619***
(0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0133)
Board Size 0.0446*** 0.0464*** 0.0468***
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0090)
Lagged Market Capitalisation 0.7066*** 0.7058*** 0.7074***
(0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0159)
Sector Similarity -0.0003** -0.0003* -0.0003*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Structural Similarity (Lag 1) 0.0022** 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Netlag (Lag1) 0.0610*** 0.0292* 0.0238*
(0.0169) (0.0116) (0.0110)
Clustering (Lag 1) -0.2059 0.0127 -0.2458
(0.4901) (0.5279) (0.5279)
Degree (Lag 1) 0.2749**
(0.0963)
Betweenness (Lag 1) 0.0000
(0.0000)
Eigenvector (Lag 1) 0.0245
(0.3973)
AIC 1910.1045 1933.4348 1915.3846
BIC 1972.7647 1996.0950 1978.0448
Log Likelihood -942.0522 -953.7174 -944.6923
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05











































































(Intercept) 2.5677*** 2.5543*** 2.5542***
(0.2375) (0.2373) (0.2399)
time 0.0624** 0.0622** 0.0622**
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196)
ROCE 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Number of Employees 0.0633*** 0.0623*** 0.0625***
(0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132)






Sector Similarity -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Structural Similarity (Lag 1) 0.0006 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Netlag (Lag1) 0.0250** 0.0213* 0.0205*
(0.0093) (0.0086) (0.0087)
Clustering (Lag 1) -0.3826 -0.2356 -0.3236
(0.4897) (0.5135) (0.5278)
Degree (Lag 1) 0.0773
(0.0667)
Betweenness (Lag 1) 0.0000
(0.0000)
Eigenvector (Lag 1) -0.0295
(0.3915)
AIC 1917.1119 1934.2998 1914.9109
BIC 1979.7721 1996.9600 1977.5711
Log Likelihood -945.5559 -954.1499 -944.4554
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05











































































(Intercept) 2.5879*** 2.5931*** 2.6100***
(0.2380) (0.2369) (0.2387)
time 0.0627** 0.0628** 0.0631**
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196)
ROCE 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Number of Employees 0.0673*** 0.0675*** 0.0673***
(0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0131)






Sector Similarity -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Structural Similarity (Lag 1) -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002*
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Netlag (Lag1) -0.0121 -0.0117 -0.0123
(0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0075)
Clustering (Lag 1) -0.4435 -0.4249 -0.3334
(0.4934) (0.5196) (0.5294)
Degree (Lag 1) -0.0103
(0.0621)
Betweenness (Lag 1) 0.0000
(0.0000)
Eigenvector (Lag 1) -0.2307
(0.3900)
AIC 1922.0899 1938.2137 1918.0939
BIC 1984.7501 2000.8740 1980.7542
Log Likelihood -948.0450 -956.1069 -946.0470
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05






























































Table 6: Comparison of results from the model and robustness checks 
VARIABLE MAIN TNAM RC: TIES THAT 
REMAIN CONSTANT 
FROM ONE YEAR TO 
THE NEXT
RC: TIES THAT CHANGE 
FROM ONE YEAR TO THE 
NEXT
ROCE No significant relationship between MCR and financial performance.
NUMBER OF 
EMPLOYEES
Larger firms associated with higher MCR.
BOARD SIZE Larger boards are associated with higher MCR. 
LAGGED MARKET 
CAPITALISATION
High MCR at time t-1 is associated with high MCR in time t.
SECTOR SIMILARITY Firms in the same sector do not share MCR levels.
STRUCTURAL 
SIMILARITY (LAG 1)
Limited evidence that firms that hold 
equivalent positions in the network, 
hold equivalent MCR levels. 
No evidence that firms that 
hold equivalent positions in 
this network, hold 
equivalent MCR levels. 
Very limited evidence that in this 
network, firm's with equivalent 
positions, hold diverging MCR 
levels. 
NETLAG (LAG1) Ties to firms with high MCR 
increases a firm’s own MCR.  
Ties to firms with high 
MCR increases a firm’s 
own MCR.  
MCR of network partners has no 
significant impact on a firm’s MCR.
CLUSTERING (LAG 1) Clustering has no significant relationship with firm MCR.
DEGREE (LAG 1) There is a positive and weakly 
significant association between 
degree centrality and MCR.
Degree centrality ha  no significant relationship with firm MCR.
BETWEENNESS (LAG 1) Betweenness centrality has no significant relationship with firm MCR.
EIGENVECTOR (LAG 1) Eigenvector centrality has no significant relationship with firm MCR.
Note: RC – Robustness Checks 











































































(Intercept) 7.0533*** 7.0597*** 7.0818***
(0.4992) (0.4988) (0.4990)
time 0.1257*** 0.1258*** 0.1261***
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156)
ROCE 0.0077 0.0074 0.0084
(0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0188)
Number of Employees 0.1187*** 0.1195*** 0.1208***
(0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0188)






Sector Similarity -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Structural Similarity (Lag 1) 0.0014* 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Netlag (Lag1) 0.0272* 0.0087 0.0047
(0.0122) (0.0072) (0.0067)
Clustering (Lag 1) 0.7023* 0.6720* 0.5816
(0.3335) (0.3424) (0.3277)
Degree (Lag 1) 0.1520*
(0.0720)
Betweenness (Lag 1) 0.0000
(0.0000)
Eigenvector (Lag 1) -0.3520
(0.2349)
AIC 1093.5168 1113.1545 1093.3602
BIC 1152.4372 1172.0748 1152.2805
Log Likelihood -533.7584 -543.5772 -533.6801
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
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